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FAMILY LAW
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER
As before, family law provided more than its share of legal curios this

year. Of more substantial importance were the decisions supporting Mexican
divorces against jurisdictional attack, suggesting that separation agreements,
though valid, could be adjusted to provide greater payments to the wife if
she was in danger of becoming a public charge, and allowing modification
of child support payments when the only changed circumstance was the fact
that the mother was no longer faced with the necessity of working out other
financial arrangements with her husband. In addition, the New York State
Legislature enacted a number of bills which affected familial economics and
an intriguing dictum raised the possibility of using arbitration as means of
settling child custody disputes.
I
MARITAL DISSOLUTION

Divorce.-The most important cases of the year were the reversals
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel and Wood v. Wood.1 By its reversals, the Court

of
of

Appeals indicated that Mexican divorces would be recognized, at least under
some circumstances, despite the absence of an extended Mexican residence or
domicile requirement.2 The decisions drew acid editorial comment through
out the state, not directed to themselves, but to divorce law which now pro
vides a safe speedy alternative to the New York adultery divorce for those
who can afford Mexican proceedings.
Despite the basic approval of Mexican divorces, the Court of Appeals
has left unanswered many questions concerning laches and estoppel.s On
the basis of prior law,4 one had reason to hope that these doctrines would at
some point bar a spouse, "divorced" by a foreign decree, from litigating the
validity of that decree. To allow the "spouse" knowingly to sit back while
remarriage occurs and a new family is created and to retain indefinitely the
power to terminate the second marriage by a declaration of invalidity seems
George J. Alexander is Associate Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College
of Law and a Member of the New York and Illinois Bars.
1. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
2. Actually, the decisions skirt making definitive pronouncements on many of the
outstanding issues concerning the validity of Mexican divorces. See Herzog. ConBict of
Laws, 1965 Survey of N.Y. Law, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 139 (1965).
3. See id. at 143.
4. Weiner v. Weiner, 13 App. Div. 2d 937, 216 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 1961): d.
Christensen v. Christensen, 39 Misc. 2d 370, 240 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963).
It may be that Mexican "mail· order " divorces are handled differently. See Boardman,
New York Family Law 984 (1964). Whether such differences as exist are sufficiently
pervasive to determine essentially economic interests is another matter. Querze v. Querze,
290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943).
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harsh. Nonetheless a "Westchester surrogate, in

Matter of Estate of Liebman/'

permitted the issue of invalidity to be raised twenty-nine years after the
Mexican divorce was obtained and a remarriage occurred. Finding the
divorce faulty, the surrogate ruled that the first wife, and not the "wife" of
twenty-nine years of marriage, was entitled to letters of administration of the
husband's estate.
Decisions in intrastate divorce law added to an already long list of
grotesque examples of where the single-ground law can lead. The Court of
Appeals held that evidence of adultery obtained by a raiding party was
,'alidly admitted.6 Fifteen days later the Appellate Division, Third Depart
ment, seemed to suggest yet another use for raiding parties in

TallcJlt.7

Tallent

v.

According to Mrs. Tallent, Mr. Tallent, during the interlocutory

petiod of his divorce, had intercourse with her on eight different occasions.
The court denied her motion to vacate the interlocutory judgment of divorce
on the grounds that her testimony as to condonation was incompetent by
virtue of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section
section literally allows

4502.

This

disproof of the defenses to adultery, but does not men

tion proof of the defenses in specifying items to which the parties can testify.
Actually, Mrs. Tallent did not come completely unprepared to these pro
(eedings. She presented an affidavit from an affiant who had been stationed
on the fire escape and who was prepared to testify as to what transpired be
tween the parties. The court refused to consider the affidavit because it
"stated merely that she [the affiant] was in a position to observe but omitted
any evidence whatever of her observation."8
The public policy against contracting with a spouse to obtain a divorce9
has always presented some problems in application. "While it has been clear
that one could not expressly condition benefits on the obtaining of a divorce.
a fault still to be found in some separation agreements,lO the courts have ap
parently blinked at the obvious fact that a separation agreement must, in
most cases, be written around an understanding as to the terms under which
the marital status is to be changed.

Viles v. Viles,11

approved this year by the

Court of Appeals,12 seems to leave parties in a somewhat greater quandary
5. 44 Misc. 2d 191, 253 N.Y.S.2d 461 (SUIT. Ct.,Westch. Co. 1963).
6. Sadder v. Sadder, 15 N.Y.2d 40,203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
7. 22 App. Div. 2d 988, 254 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't 1964).
8. Id. at 989,254 N.y.s.2d at 724.
9. N.Y. Gen. Ob. Law § 5-311.
10. Fisher v. Fisher, 43 Misc. 2d 905,252 N.y.s.2d 643 (Sup. Ct.,N.Y. Co. 1964). The
agreement in this case provided that: "'In the event that the parties hereto are stm
united in the bonds of matrimony on the 1st day of March, 1963 then it is mutually agreed
that all the terms, covenants and agreements herein contained shall cease to be binding
' Id. at 906,252 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
upon either of the parties for any purpose
11. See Alexander,Family Law, 1963 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369 373.
'
n.32 (1963) and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
12. 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1964).
.

.

.

•

"
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than they previously faced by its invalidation of an agreement because of its
unrecorded connection with divorce plans.
A more candid appraisal of the workings of dissolution proceedings
seems implicit in the decision in

Herzog

v.

Herzog,13

where a court granted

an interlocutory decree of divorce on motion of the defendant after the
plaintiff wife, having won her case, refused to enter a decree. The court rea
soned that since the parties had agreed to a financial settlement and the hus
band had thereafter withdrawn his defense, she could not then prevent his
obtaining the benefits of the arrangement-a divorce. Another court felt
called upon to tell a plaintiff, this time one who had proceeded a bit further
in the procedure, that she could not take back her decree during the inter
locutory period because she suddenly discovered it to be to her financial ad
vantage not to have obtained the interlocutory decree.14
As yet unclear is the extent to which Mr. Justice Harlan is correct in

Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank15

when he suggests that the United

States Supreme Court is now revising the divisible divorce doctrine.
Annulment.-Annulment has, of course, always been a viable alterna
tive to divorce in this state.16 Of the grounds for annulment, "fraud" presents
the most appealing, apparently because no one seems sure of what it means.
The Appellate Division, First Department, this year again recited as a con
trolling test the quotation from

Schoenfeld

v.

Schoenfe ld :17

" 'The court is

left free to meet each case as it arises and to apply to the defendant's conduct
the immemorial test of fair and conscientious dealing.' "18 Such a suggestion
of an almost

ad hoc

approach to decisions in the annulment cases, coupled

with the still significant quantum of litigation, must be a source of encour
agement to plaintiffs with minimal complaints. Take, for example, the com
plaint of Emma Pankiw19 who sought annulment in
which dated from

1949

1964

of a marriage

on the grounds that her husband had not revealed

his premarital paternity of an illegitimate child and that he had misrep
resented his age by two years. Since, absent any representation to the con
trary, courts have not considered it an obligation of a marital partner to
disclose fully his premarital sexual exploits20 and since the paternity issue
did not relate to any postmarital difficulty, the fraud ground really stood or
fell on the misrepresentation of his age. Not surprisingly, it fell. On the other
hand, the first department, employing the test of fair and conscientious deal
ing, found that a representation by a husband that he was born in Germany,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
1964).
19.
20.

46 Misc. 2d 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1965).
Gilstein v. Gilstein, 23 App. Div. 2d 678, 257 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1965).
381 U.S. 81 (1965). See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
See Note, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1941).
260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933).
Sophian v. Von Linde, 22 App. Div. 2d 34, 36, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (1st Dep't
Pankiw v. Pankiw, 45 Misc. 2d 206, 256 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1965).
Glean v. Glean, 70 App. Div. 576, 75 N.Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dep't 1902).
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a member of the nobility and a Graf (count), when false, was sufficiently
fraudulent to allow the aunt of a deceased wife an annulment on the wife's
behalf.:!l Yet the same department, in

Kober

v.

Kober,22

only four months

later, denied an annulment where the husband had allegedly concealed his
German ancestry and had also concealed that he had been an officer in the
Gelman army and a member of the Nazi party, that he was at the time of
marriage and at the time of complaint a strong anti-Semite, that he believed
that the solution to the Jewish problem was the "Final Solution" of the
Jewish question, namely, the extermination of the Jewish people, and that
he would require his wife to terminate her friendship with Jews.
Separations.

Even separations are not necessarily easy to obtain. For

-

example, one justice, in ruling against a separation, stated:
The plaintiff admitted that at various times she spat on defendant, that since
December, 1963, she has refused to have sexual relations with him and has told
him to go and get another woman, that prior to the incident in which defendant
held her head under the bathtub faucet she had thrown a pot of water on him
and that prior to the incident in which he tied her hands and feet,he had sought
to make love to her and she had repulsed him, slapping and kicking him.23

Since this is an almost perfect case illustrating the defense of recrimination,
the result is not novel.
II
CHILDREN

A nagging problem has been the right of a mother to the return of her
child from an agency with which the child may have been placed.24 The crux
of the problem lies in the length of time required to terminate permanently
a parental right to custody.25 It seems clear that strong public policy suggests
leaving an avenue open by which parental custody can be reestablished.
Apparently, it is only in the service of that end that the parents' interests are
to be given controlling weight. In

Pcrkings Adoption Serv.,26

People ex rei. Anonymous

v.

Talbott

a mother who sought custody of her child in De

cember following a September surrender to the commissioner of welfare was
denied her child because her purpose was to accomplish a private placement
adoption and not to take custody herself.
It has long been established that the parents of a child may agree on his
religious upbringing while they continue to live together or as an incident to
21. Sophian v. Von Linde,22 App. Div. 2d 34,253 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1st Dep't 1964).
22. 22 App. Div. 2d 468, 256 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1st Dep't 1965). Subsequent to the writing
of this article the decision of the appellate division was reversed in 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211
N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965).
23. Becker v. Becker,46 Misc. 2d 858, 859, 260 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
1965).
24. See Alexander, supra note 11, at 377-78.
25. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 611 (supstantia1 abandonment for more than one year); cf.
N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law §§ 111-12.
26. 46 Misc. 2d 369, 259 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1965).
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an agreement to separate.27 Such an agreement, however, does not interfere
with a court's power to redetermine the issue in the best interests of the
child. When the child is mature enough to have his wishes considered, they
may be found to override his parents' agreement.28 Where the parties have
not reached an agreement on the religious upbringing of the child, courts
have been careful to avoid decreeing the form of religious training the child
is to obtain.29 Since the courts will not direct that the child be raised in a
religion different from that of the custodial parent, the result may be to
change the child's religion.30 The court may, however, require that the non
custodial parent be given an opportunity to have the child trained reli
giously during his visitations or during a period of temporary custody,31 and
failure of the custodial parent to allow such religious training can be
punished by contempt.32 The question of the importance of an agreement
between the parties in cases where children were too young to advise the
court of the appropriate disposition has remained unresolved. In O'Neill

v.

O'Neill,33 the court allowed a child formerly raised in a Catholic home to be
brought up by the custodial mother in the Jewish faith, despite her having
executed a written undertaking that any children of the marriage would be
raised in the Roman Catholic religion and despite the child's baptism as a
Roman Catholic. The court noted:
As a mother has and will have custody of the child, it would lead to great conflict
and probable injury to the child's psychological well·being to attempt to compel
the mother to raise the child against the mother's will in a religion that is
different from the religion of the mother's home and it would represent for the
child a sharp compulsory break from the religion with which she now feels herself
to be affiliated and which she knows is the religion in which her mother wishes to
raise her.34

Several courts this year concluded that while they were under no obliga
tion to enforce foreign custody decrees, they were inclined to accept them by
comity where the decrees did not seem injurious to the best interest of the
child. At a minimum, there was no need to redetermine custody provisions
de novo when a determination had been made by a foreign court.35 Beyond
27. Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 492 (1932).
28. Martin v. Martin,308 N.Y. 136,123 N.E.2d 812 (1954).
29. People ex reI. Sisson v. Sisson,271 N.Y. 285,2 N.E.2d 660 (1936). "The court cannot
regulate by its process the internal affairs of the home. Dispute between parents when it
does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the welfare of the child is beyond the
reach of the law." Id. a t 287,2 N.E.2d at 661. Thus it is normally improper to change the
custody of children solely to effect a change in religious training.
30. Paolella v. Phillips, 27 Mise. 2d 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1960);
cf. Seltzer v. Wendell, 11 App. Div. 2d 805, 205 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1960).
31. Seltzer v. Wendell, supra note 30.
32. Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,31 Mise. 2d 58,220 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct.,N.Y. Co. 1961).
33. 45 Mise. 2d 1,255 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965).
34. Id. at 4, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
35. Sloane v. Sloane, 15 N.Y.2d 561, 203 N.E.2d 217, 254 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1964). For a
discussion of the case see Alexander, Family Law, 1964 Survey of N.Y. Law, 16 Syracuse L.
Rev. 402, 416 (1964).
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that, the agreement of the parents may be accepted as

an

appropriate

basis for disposition where circumstances have remained substantially un
changed.36 To say that the parties may by agreement or as a result of litiga
tion in an out-of-state court relieve the courts of the necessity of making a
de novo inquiry does not suggest that custodial questions can be summarily
handled by trial courts, absent such an agreement or judgment, without a
hearing.37 Since the focus of the inquiry is on the best interests of the child,
and not of his parents, the fact that one of the litigants is a parent and the
other is not, need not be determinative.3s On the other hand, parental rights
are strong enough, in most cases, to require an inquiry into their termina
tion before the ties are judicially declared cut. Consequently, a first husband
must be given a hearing on the issue of abandonment before an adoption of
his child by a second husband can be approved without his consent.39
The involvement of courts in an attempt to find other means of effectu
ating the best interest of children led to three rather remarkable cases this
year. In the

Matter of S,40

a family court judge, apparently sharing the frus

tration of some of his brethren concerning the inability to establish a child
battering case, decided that a case would be sufficiently made out by the pro
duction of a young child bearing evidence of physical abuse absent a satis
factory explanation as to his condition. According to the judge, he had bor
rowed the

res ipsa loquitur

principle. 'While one can sympathize with the

court's motive, it seems doubtful that the situation is far different from crim
inal proceedings in which it would be equally expeditious to make a defen
dant exculpate himself.
In

;.lfatter of Higgins,41

a family court judge was faced with a demand

by Michigan authorities that she sign a guarantee against the child's becom
ing a public charge in Michigan in order to validate a private arrangement
that had been made for the child with his maternal aunt in Michigan upon
the death of the child's mother. The easy solution for the judge would have
been to hold, as she did, that she lacked statutory authority to enter any
such agreement. Noting, however, that it is "poor laws" of the kind which
here required a guarantee that make satisfactory placement of children out
side of the state difficult, Judge PoIier, in a carefully worded opinion, held
additionally that the Michigan statute contravened the United States Con
stitution. Although one may doubt that there will be an immediate response
to the court's opinion by the Michigan Legislature it can be hoped that the
36. Foussier v. Uzielli, 23 App. Div. 2d 260, 260 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1st Dep't 1965); Abreu
v. Abreu, 45 Misc. 2d 952, 261 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Family Ct., Ulster Co. 1965).
37. People ex rel. Jackson v . Mitchell, 22 App. Div. 2d 903, 255 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d
Dep't 1965); People ex reI. Putziger, 22 App. Div. 2d 821, 254 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1964).
38. People ex reI. Conti v. Molinari, 23 App. Div. 2d 893, 260 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't
1965).
39. Matter of Favro, 44 Misc. 2d 464, 254 N.y.s.2d 278 (Family Ct., Steuben Co. 1964).
40. 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct., Kings Co. 1965).
'
41 . 46 Mise. 2d 233, 259 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965).
,
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opinion will make agencies concerned with child placement more reluctant
to accept at face value state poor laws as a bar to child placement.
The most curious decision of the group is

Matter of Anonymous.42

In

that case, a child had been placed, upon discharge from the hospital after its
birth, in the home of adoptive parents by an attorney apparently acting as
an intermediary between them and the mother. An action for adoption was
brought when the child was fourteen. Since there was apparently no objec
tion as to the adoptive parents, only two issues remained in the way of a
judicial approval of the adoption. The first was that the natural mother of
the child was Protestant while the adoptive parents were Jewish. The second
was that the child had been placed by the attorney in apparent contraven
tion of Social "\Velfare Law Section

374.

Under section

389

of the same act,

the attorney might be subject to misdemeanor prosecution.
The religious problem did not cause the judge great difficulty. He read

Matter of Maxwell43

as allowing sufficient discretion to approve this adop

tion, in light of the natural mother's consent that her child be raised as a
Jew. This conclusion raises again the meaning of the religious matching re
quirement44 which controls the placement of children. It is not too clear by
what standard one judges the religious faith of a newborn child, although
that appears to be the controlling focus. However one answers that question,
it would seem to relate to an objective fact, not to a maternal right which
the mother is capable of altering by contract.

Matter of Maxwell

could well

be read as limited to circumstances in which the natural mother lied about
her religion and the adoptive parents relied on her statement, a situation
which would be inapplicable in the instant case.45 Since it is easy to have
grave reservations about the desirability of forced religious matching both
from the standpoint of church·state separation46 and its utility in proper
child placement,47 one may hope that the instant extension of the

Maxwell

case finds judicial favor.
The other issues sufficiently troubled the judge so that he ultimately
denied the adoption. Although the relevant sections of the Social Welfare
Law may well support the judge's conclusion that the placing out by an
attorney is unlawful, the conclusion that a child unlawfully placed out can
not be adopted seems curious indeed. The apparent reason for these provi42. 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Family Ct., Dutchess Co. 1965).
43. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
44. See Ramsey,The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceed·
ings, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 649 (1959).
45. In any event, the later amendment of the religious matching requirement, Family
Ct. Act § 116(e), so as to restrictively define "when practicable," the words relied upon by
the Maxwell majority, seems to make even the Maxwell holding questionable.
46. Ramsey, supra note 44, at 680-84.
47. It is interesting to contrast the mandatory religious matching provisions with the
suggestion that racial considerations may not even be considered. See Rockefeller v.
Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962), discussed in
Alexander, supra note 11, at 378.

HeinOnline -- 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 324 1965-1966

325

FAMILY LAW

sions of the Social Welfare Law was a legislative concern for black market
babies.48 One may doubt the judge's assertion, made on the basis of these
sections , that the Legislature has declared a public policy "prohibiting adop
tions which begin improperly."49 Equally curious is what appears to be the
major rationale for the decision. "The motivation and professional approach
which welfare departments and authorized adoption agencies can give can
not be substituted for

[sic]

one unskilled in social work no matter how

benevolent his motives in investigating and evaluating the material elements
of an adoption proceeding and placing a child in a family unit."50 Such an
argument might well explain the result in a state where placement is a state
monopoly, but it is hard to follow in New York where private placement
adoption is a legislatively established alternative to the placement by au
thorized agencies.lil It seems clear that the mother could have directly placed
the child,52 and it is apparently accepted by the court that the foster parents
were appropriate adoptive parents. "Why Judge Jiudice felt compelled to
punish the child and the adoptive parents

as

a means of implementing the

misdemeanor provisions of the Social 'Welfare Law is unclear.
Of greatest importance in this area is the dictum of the appellate divi
sion in

Sheets v. Sheets,53

in which the court went to considerable lengths to

endorse the legitimacy of a provision for arbitration of disputed custody
questions in private agreements. Apparently, between the parents, arbitra
tion may provide a final answer to disputes should the parents choose to
include an appropriate provision in their separation agreement. Of course,
the court reserves the right to override their wishes in the interest of the
child.54
III
PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY

The question of whether a married woman may bring a suit for pater
nity of her child in light of the rewording of the definition of "child born out
48. See People v. Scopas, 11 N.Y.2d 120, 181 N.E.2d 754, 227 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1962)
(dissenting opinion).
49. Matter of Anonymous, supra note 42,at 930, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
50. Ibid.
51. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law §§ 115·16.
52. N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 374(2).
53. 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964).
54. The court adds:
[S]ubmission of disputes in custody and visitation matters to voluntary arbitration
need no longer receive general interdiction, and such procedures should be
encouraged as a sound and practical method for resolving such disputes. But as
indicated hereinabove, arbitration awards which may adversely affect the best
interests of the child will be disregarded by the courts whose paternal jurisdiction
is paramount. As a consequence, there may in certain instances be a duplication
of effort, where the court decides to look into the matter de novo and reaches
the same or different result.
Id. at 179·80,254 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
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of wedlock" is still being litigated.55 The ever increasing consensus appears
to be that, under appropriate circumstances, she may.56
A number of procedural matters were also clarified. Section 517(b) of
the Family Court Act is an obvious attempt to preserve the State's interest
in having children supported by their parents. This section provides that the
commissioner of welfare may bring an action for paternity within a period
of ten years after the birth of the child, although the mother is only per
mitted two years for such action in most circumstances. Reading this intent
into the unqualified language of the statute, a court this year conditioned
the exercise of the commissioner's right on a demonstration that the mother
would likely become a recipient of welfare payments.57 It remained clear,
however, that paternity orders protect the child's interest in support as well
as relieving the State's concern that it might otherwise shoulder the burden.
Thus, orders could properly issue commanding fathers to support children
who were out of state.58
A new provision of the Decedent Estate Law, Section 83-a, fills a iong
felt need for greater inheritance rights for illegitimate children.59 The
statute provides, broadly, that for purposes of intestate succession an illegiti
mate child shall inherit from and through his mother and from his father
if an order of paternity has issued against him. In tum, those from whom the
illegitimate child is entitled to distribution, inherit from him. What appears
to be most controversial in this new statute is provision ( l )(c) which bars
inheritance from the father on the basis of an agreement or compromise of
the paternity question short of an order of filiation. This section would seem
to provide at least one reason for the bringing of some paternity actions that
might otherwise be settled. If, in practice, it will have that result, one may
regard this qualification as unfortunate.
IV
FAMILY ECONOMICS

The question of the title to marital property, always a thorny problem ,6 0
has not been made easier by the passage of Domestic Relations Law Section
55. For prior installments of the dispute see Alexander, supra note 35, at 412.
56. Fitzsimmons v. De Cicco, 44 Mise. 2d 307, 253 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Family Ct., Ulster
Co. 1964); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 43 Misc. 2d 1050, 252 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Family Ct.,
Albany Co. 1964).
57. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 44 Misc. 2d 770, 254 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Family Ct.,N.Y. Co.
1964).
58. Urbancig v. Pipitone, 23 App. Div. 2d 193, 259 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1965) (child
in Canada); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 44 Misc. 2d 721, 255 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Family Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1964).
59. See Alexander, supra note 35, at 414.
60. For a discussion of recent problems concerning jointly held property, see Alex
ander, supra note 11, at 369-70.
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23-1.61 Slowly, ambiguities will, no doubt, resolve themselves. One thing is
reasonably clear. The section which allows a court in a matrimonial action
to (1) determine questions of title to property and (2) make directions con
ceming possession of property in the court's discretion, does not alter extant
rules goveming the determination of title questions between spouses. Conse
quently, general equities conceming the need for or the use of property will
not alter vested titles.6!! If that is correct, it would seem to follow that the
provision of section 234 allowing directions to be made in "one or more
orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment or by both
such order or orders and final judgment" cannot relate to questions of title
which presumably remain immutable. That in tum suggests that the entire
quoted section relates only to directions conceming the possession of prop
erty as opposed to its title. So holding, Justice Coleman, in

Roth

v.

Roth,63

refused to consider the question of title on a motion subsequent to a deter
mination in the underlying matrimonial dispute.
As is well known, the rules goveming alimony display a bias in favor of
the wife. For example, even excessive awards of alimony retroactively re
duced by appeal cannot be recovered from the wife once paid.64 If the hus
band can avoid making required payments until he obtains a dismissal of
his wife's action, can he avoid payment? After

Polizotti

v.

Polizotti,65

one

would have thought so. A case this year suggests otherwise. Punishing a de
fendant for contempt of court for failure to make temporary alimony pay
ments prior to a dismissal of the complaint, the court66 distinguished

zotti

Poli

on the basis that the contempt action there had not been concluded

prior to the dismissal of the complaint. 'Whether the contempt would lie for
alTearages held erroneously excessive remains to be seen.
As usual, alimony amounts were contested and recontested. Courts,
tiring of hearing the same parties argue change of circumstances to alter a
previous decree, have had to be admonished to provide a hearing for the
claimant.67 One may well doubt that a system requiring such extensive com
mitments of judicial energy is the best means of handling the problem of the
postmarital support of the wife.
An altemative to litigating the level of support is, of course, a separa

tion agreement. By making such an agreement the parties settle their own
support arrangements and, if there is neither overreaching nor contraven61. See Siegel, Practice Commentary,N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 234, at 123-28 (McKinney)
on the sketchy legislative history.
62. Fluhr v. Fluhr,44 Mise. 2d 1098, 255 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1965).
63. 45 Misc. 2d 150, 256 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964).
64. Glassman v. Glassman, 41 Misc. 2d 132, 245 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co.
1963).
65. 305 N.Y. 176, III N.E.2d 869 (1953).
66. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 44 Misc. 2d 980,255 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct.,N.Y. Co. 1964).
. 67. Gilbert v : Gilbert, 23 App. Div. 2d 757, 258 N.y.s.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1965); Reiss v.
ReISS. 23 App. DIV. 2d 692. 257 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1965).
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tion of public policy against contracting for a divorce, such agreements are
upheld and prevent litigation, by either party, of the support level deter
mined. Two decisions this year suggest important qualifications. In
v.

McMains,6s

McMains

the Court of Appeals determined that a separation agreement.

otherwise valid to bar suit for an increase in support payment, will not bar
such an increase if it is required to prevent the wife's becoming a public
charge. In

Guillermo

v.

Guillermo,69

interpreting a separation agreement

that had been incorporated into a foreign decree, the court hinted at the
possibility of another exception. The GuiIIermos had negotiated their finan
cial arrangement and then obtained a Mexican divorce decree which in
corporated the terms of their separation agreement. Petitioning the court
for an alteration in support payments for the child, the wife claimed, as the
only changed circumstance, the fact that the child's support needs could now
be considered independently of the other complications inherent in the
dissolution of the marriage. In effect, she argued, she had been forced to
accept too Iow a figure for the child's support as a means of effecting the final
settlement. The court allowed the alteration, apparently giving controlling
weight to the fact that the payments were to be for the support of the child.
One cannot be sure what position the court would have taken had the
petitioner also sought modification of alimony payments for her support on
the same basis. Presumably, it would have denied her additional request
despite the fact that, having been conciliatory to obtain a settlement on
other issues, she would now feel less restrained if allowed to address herself
solely to the question of her needs.
For spouses, the choice may be between agreeing to the terms of a sepa
ration agreement intended to survive the divorce decree which, according
to the reasoning of

McMains,

would remain controlling short of the indi

gency of the wife, and having their agreement incorporated in the divorce
decree, which might leave it open to modification on changed circumstances
(although probably more than the

Guillermo

showing would be required to

constitute the change). The choice has other ramifications. For example,
while court decrees terminate on remarriage, separation agreements may
survive remarriage.70 The Legislature, probably realizing the importance of
alimony payments to many parties, wisely equated a

de facto family relation

ship on the wife's part with her remarriage.71 A husband obligated under the
terms of a separation agreement which does not contain such an alternative
68. 15 N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1965).
69. 43 Misc. 2d 763, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964).
70. See generally, Boardman, New York Family Law 575-76 (1964).
71. Thus, by § 248 of the Domestic Relations Law, a court may terminate alimony
payments when a woman habitually resides with a man other than her former husband
and holds the new man out as her husband. This provision is, of course, not as strong as
the mandatory requirement, in the same section, that alimony be terminated on remarriage.
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cut off date found himself, this year, forced to support a wife who had ap
parently established a

de facto

relationship with another man.72

Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States, at least in Mr. Justice

Vanderbilt
Vanderbilt73 which held New York entitled to enforce a separation decree's
support obligation despite an out-of-state divorce. In Simons v. Miami Beach
First Nat'l Bank,74 the Court held that a Florida divorce terminated the
Harlan's opinion, has taken the first step toward a repudiation of

v.

dower right, in accordance with Florida law, of a New York domiciliary who
had not appeared in the Florida action. All the Justices except Mr. Justice
Harlan denied that the case repudiated the

Vanderbilt

approach. They

pointed out that Florida, and not New York, had undertaken to provide
dower and that the support payment ordered by the New York court had,
in this case, faithfully been paid during the life of the former husband. To
be sure, this is true. One could have supposed, however, that the division in
divisible divorce was one separating economic rights for which full faith and
credit would not be required, unless in personam jurisdiction had been ob
tained over both spouses and status considerations which could be altered
by a foreign court with in personam jurisdiction over only one. Carrying
such a dichotomy to its conclusion, the Florida court would have been
without power to change the wife's economic right-her right to dower.
So long as New York law, by its perversity, makes migratory divorce com
mon, any assault on

Vanderbilt poses a

threat to basic New York interests.

If postmarital economics are complicated and occasionally unjust, at
least the Legislature has seen fit to remove actions for restitution of gifts
given in contemplation of marriage from the interdiction of the anti-heart
balm legislation; consequently, one can hope that premarital finances will
be equitably adjusted.75 Other economic changes of importance altered as
pects of a surviving spouse's right of election,76 relieved persons of the obli
gation to support grandchildren who are recipients of welfare assistance,77
and gave illegitimate children considerably greater rights of inheritance.78
v

THE FAMILY COURT ACT
In no field of law is the gulf between normative assumptions underly
ing law and conduct any greater than in family law. As a result, when not
bound by precedent, courts are free to come to entirely different conclusions
72. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 46 Misc. 2d 693, 260 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. T., 1st Dep't
1965).
73. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
74. 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
75. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80·b (McKinney Supp. 1965).
76. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 18·b (McKinney Supp. 1965).
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 415.
78. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 83·a (MCKinney Supp. 1965), and see text accompanying note
59 supra.
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by choosing to focus on either the stated norms or on well-known realities.
Take, for example, the

de facto

family. It will startle no one that "there are

countless households where man and woman reside with their offspring in a
domestic relationship on a permanent basis without being legally married."79
But how can a judge respond to such a relationship? On the one hand, with
out any difficulty, he can point to the many instances in legislation and
court decrees in which the public policy in favor of marriage and against
"illicit" relationships is established. On that basis a judge may make a
decision helping to bring about a termination of the irregular relationship.
On the other hand, it is possible to view the problem with a recognition that

de facto

the

family is probably both too useful and too well established to

fall in the face of judicial bluster.
Article 8 of the Family Court Act creates family offense proceedings
which are designed to render help to families with internal strife. In legis

lative contemplation, the procedure was essentially conciliatory in nature.8 0
Does it apply to members of

de facto

families? In

People v. Dugar,

the court

realistically stated:
Such households are responsible for many of the most difficult social problems
They present behavior problems, support problems, mental and emotional
problems. They concern the health, welfare and safety of children. They result
in filiation proceedings, support proceedings and juvenile proceedings. In short,
from a social point of view, this is a situation where the unique and flexible
procedures and services available in the Family Court may possibly find a
remedy.81

.

.

•

.

This year a court thought differently:
It is the public policy of this State not to place children in a situation which
would impair their morals. .
Assuming this court accepted jurisdiction, the most that we could do in order
to help would be to effect a marital reconciliation, which is impossible in this
situation. Actually, it would make the court a party, not only to an immoral
relationship, but also, this court would be encouraging this relationship to
continue.
The conciliation procedures cannot be utilized in this situation where there
is no marriage to begin with.82
•

.

On the other hand, it would seem that once a marital knot is tied, it
may remain tied for family offense proceedings purposes. In Koeppel v.

Judges of Family Court,83 a former husband was unsuccessful in

pleading his

prior divorce as a bar to the invocation of family offense proceedings against
him by his wife. Is the aim of the proceeding to reunite the former spouses?
79. People v. Dugar, 37 Misc. 2d 652, 653, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (Dist. Ct., Nassau
Co. 1962).
80. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 811.
81. Supra note 79, at 653·54, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
82. Best v. Macklin, 46 Misc. 2d 622, 623, 260 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (Family Ct., Dutchess
Co. 1965).
83. 44 Mise. 2d 799, 254 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1964).

HeinOnline -- 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 330 1965-1966

